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DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE

BY SAMUEL P. ORTH

It is now sixty-four years since De Tocqueville said that in writing *Democracy in America* his mind had been "constantly occupied by a single thought—that the advent of democracy as a governing power in the world's affairs, universal and irresistible, was at hand." These words were spoken while France was washing her hands of the blood of the Revolution of 1848. The Republic that the political philosopher deemed so securely founded has passed through strange vicissitudes since then.

Democratic liberty has not come as easily nor as quickly as De Tocqueville supposed. The struggle is even now going on everywhere. And this struggle is not without interest to the citizens of our democracy, which formed the inspiration of De Tocqueville's study and which commands a rapidly increasing influence in the affairs of the world.

Democracy in Europe and democracy in America convey two very different impressions. Their development and their ideals have remained distinct, owing to our isolation both geographical and historical. We are practically as far separated from feudalism and monarchy as the Aztecs. And the oceans have secured us that isolation which to-day is essential to national individuality. The development of popular government on both sides of the Atlantic, the one fresh and original, the other slowly working out of the encumbering traditions of the past, makes one wonder whether, after all, there is such a thing as "democracy," and whether such a person as a democrat *pur et simple* exists.

Government always implies a man, a committee, or a mob. The movement now is mobward. The masses are eagerly snatching the powers away from the man and the committee and are holding it in their own fingers. The scepter is transformed into a ballot. Power, authority, tyranny there must be; and who shall be the tyrant is simply a question of

man or mass. At this moment Europe presents every gradation in this popularization of government from Switzerland to Russia.

France has always been a political yeast-pot. The Frenchman changes coats with the readiness of an actor, but he never changes heart. *Bourgeois* or *noblesse* or proletarian may wield the instruments of sovereignty, but the domestic life of the industrious, impulsive, imaginative Frenchman goes right on without even the quiver of an eyelash. Paris may be in a turmoil; France remains thrifty.

The Republic is not democratic, and it is a Republic in name only. It is a collection of communal tyrannies: it is a centralized bureaucracy. This is not mere paradox.

First it is a collection of communal tyrannies. This is due to the personal nature of the government. There are no well-organized political parties, as in England or with us. There is no party responsibility. In the Chamber of Deputies all shades of opinions are represented by numerous groups who guard their little distinctions with the intellectual jealousy known only among a people who have more fervor for idealization than for realization. There is only one disciplined political party, the united Socialists, and these are split into Jauresites and Guesdeists, who have each other continually by the ears.

It follows that the country is ruled by Deputies, not by parties. The Chamber of Deputies controls the ministry, and the ministry is the government. As long as the cabinet can swing a majority of the Chamber it remains in power—but no longer.

The result is singular. Where there is no party fealty and responsibility the individual Deputy is everything. The government depends on his vote, and his place depends upon the voters. He stands or falls as an individual. So he finds it necessary to please his electorate. He does this in many ways. Chiefly, however, by finding places on the Government pay-roll for as many of his constituents as possible. Appointments are made by the Government, and the Government needs the Deputy's vote. This is the charmed circle of French independence. In his own district the Deputy is a little political Tsar. In the Chamber he is a member of an aggregate Tsardom.

This pretty game of "ring around" the Deputy is played

with great glee and gusto by these Gallic children. They average about two ministries a year. Each change is dramatic, accompanied by all those accomplishments of voice and gesture of which the Frenchman alone is master.

This democratic feature of the French constitution is neutralized by one of the most omnipotent systems of centralized bureaucracy in Europe. France has the decentralization of democracy in her legislative system; and has retained the centralization of Napoleonic autocracy in her administrative system. This places at the disposal of the ministry an enormous power, greater than that possessed even by the reactionary German officialdom. This power extends into every commune. Appointed state officials are given the veto power over local and departmental officers. It is the perennial complaint of the Socialists—*e. g.*, that they are hampered by the hostility of the administrative officers. Many towns and cities have Socialist mayors or councils, and many of their acts are reviewed by the higher administrative courts. When the localities determine to establish some municipal enterprise, like a drug-store or a street-car system, they find their acts promptly vetoed by this superior authority. Local autonomy is curtailed. Many French lawyers and publicists seem to regard this as wholesome. On the whole, the administrative officers are liberal in their treatment of local authorities and resort to the veto in extreme cases only. This is not the opinion of the localities. They resent the interference, and their temper has a prompt effect upon their Deputy, who in turn visits his disfavor upon the ministry that happens to be in power.

The dominion of the bureaucracy is not only administrative. It is also political. There are nearly a million functionaries in France. This includes, however, the workmen in the mint, the navy-yards, and the national tobacco and match works, as well as teachers, policemen, etc. There is one civil servant to every forty inhabitants and one to every eleven voters. A civil-service routine has been established, but it by no means places this great horde of public servants beyond the reach of the designing Deputy or the ambitious minister. The result is a clientelism that is stultifying both to servant and service. The minor officials are constantly made aware that they owe allegiance to some one higher up. The Deputy from the district needs votes: that is the all-important fact. And the ministry needs the Deputy. So

there is a serried system of political alms-giving and personal political fealty from the Prime Minister down to the communal letter-carrier.

How effectively this duplex machinery can be used by a cabinet was shown during the critical times of the Dreyfus turmoil and the disestablishment of the Church which followed in its wake. The coalition between the Radicals and the Socialists that ruled during these eventful years did not hesitate to use every facility of power to control the situation. Combes, the premier, perfected a system of espionage that spread its network over every *arrondissement*. In every locality the Government had its spy or "*délégué*," whose duty it was to report every action of suspected functionaries. General André's army spies and their reports—the notorious "*fisches*"—became historic. They dogged the suspects to the church or caught them unawares drinking absinthe in out-of-the-way *cafés*, contrary to regulations. The one was evidence that the offender adhered to the church of the monarchists, the other that he flouted the rules of the Republic. His dismissal was a matter of course.

When these things were exposed, André had to resign. They show the possibilities of a system that has reproduced the clientelism of Rome. In place of the opulent and haughty patron dispensing favors to his sycophants, the French have *bourgeois* politicians dispensing political favors and demanding obeisance.

One hears less to-day of the secret political alliance called "freemasonry" that is supposed to unite the radical and Socialist elements into a secret and powerful opposition to Royalists and Clericals. On the other hand, the monarchists are never inactive. At present they are quite in evidence.

In spite of all this, France and the French go merrily on. Democracy is the ruling power in French politics. An observer who moves among the people wonders how much of a power it is in French life. The French are a nation of small farmers and shopkeepers. They cling to their property while they vote for Socialism or democracy, or a blend now popular, social democracy. They love possessions and they love political speculations. Their statecraft is touched with a kind of political poesy. They vote and debate with imaginative zeal. They pay taxes with stolid, commonplace silence. Not that the Frenchman does not take his politics seriously. He takes it as seriously as he takes religion or

literature or art. There is only one thing he takes more seriously, his property. And he wants a government that will hold his property inviolate.

The French are, after all, the greatest realists. They speculate with democracy, but they never loose their grip on their Russian bonds and on their little shops and their little farms. Their Radicalism must respect property.

In Belgium the property question has entered politics in a very impressive manner. Here, as in many other countries, Socialism and Radicalism joined hands in a fight for universal suffrage, the first step toward democracy. The electorate was restricted to property-holders. In 1890 out of a population of nearly 6,000,000 only 133,000 were qualified electors. The struggle of the disenfranchised ones to wrest political power from the property-owners was accompanied by the general strike, the "class war" of the Socialist, who is always a democrat, for he must have the power of the State to accomplish the economic changes he has in mind. In 1886 the first general strike movement spread over this little industrial country, whose population is the densest, the most miserably housed, and the most illiterate in northern Europe. But the working-men were not well organized and the strike failed.

The political power was held by the Clerical party. There was a small group of Liberals in Parliament who were later augmented by a few Radicals. The Liberals and Radicals were in favor of an extended franchise, the Clericals were content to let things alone.

Outside of Parliament, outside the walls of political privilege, were the horde of Belgian workmen, now thoroughly organized for a determined fight. In 1892 riots occurred in various cities. Popular demonstrations, in which Liberals and Radicals joined, were held throughout the country. But Parliament remained obdurate. The Labor party ordered a general strike. It began in the coal-mines of Hainault, spread to the spinners and weavers of Ghent, to the glass and iron works of the Walloon district, and to the docks and shipping of Antwerp. While the mills and mines were idle the police were busy. In Brussels the determined mob pried up the paving-stones for weapons and held the capital in terror.

In the height of the excitement the Chamber of Repre-

sentatives met and agreed upon a new franchise law. Immediately the general strike was declared off and the Labor party issued a proclamation: "The Labor party, through its General Council, records the insertion of manhood suffrage in the constitution. It declares that the first victory of the party has been won under pressure of a general strike."

The new law did not grant universal and uniform electoral rights. It gave a second and third vote to persons possessing certain educational and other qualifications. The Radicals immediately began an agitation to introduce proportional representation. In 1899 the Government brought in a bill conceding the right of proportional representation, but limiting it to the large districts, where the anti-Clericals were strongest. A huge protest was organized against this partial measure. In Brussels mobs surrounded the Chamber of Representatives, and the Socialist members tried to prevent business on the inside by resorting to mob tactics. Desk lids were banged, there was shouting and singing, and one Deputy had provided himself with a tin horn. The Government was compelled to adjourn the sitting. The mayors of Brussels, Ghent, Antwerp, and Liège waited on the king and told him they would no longer be responsible for the maintenance of order if the ministry did not accede to the popular demands. This had the desired effect and proportional representation for all districts was effected.

In 1902 a third general strike was called by the Labor party to compel the enactment of a law abolishing plural voting and establishing simple, universal manhood suffrage. But the strike was ill-timed and failed.

Here we have the interesting spectacle of the democracy resorting to force in order to wrest the right of franchise from a constitutional monarchy. Under the first election of the law of 1892, the Chamber of Representatives was constituted as follows: Clericals, 104; Liberals, 19; Socialists, 29. With the enactment of proportional representation the balance remained with the Clericals, but with a greatly reduced majority: Clericals, 85; Liberals, 31; Socialists, 32; Radicals, 3; Christian Socialists, 1.

Last August in Brussels a monster demonstration took place in favor of "Free Schools and Free Ballots." All progressives joined with the Socialists in this great meeting to impress upon the Government that their demands must be granted. When all property and educational qualifica-

tions are removed, as they will be within a few years, the conservative Clericals will become a minority and one more Royal democracy will be added to the European sisterhood.

Germany presents the most medieval and the most democratic tendencies of Europe. It is not very easy to understand Germany. Her Government is feudal, her population democratic; both are dogmatic. German democracy hates German *Junkedom*, and the "*Regierung*" hates the democrats. There is no middle ground, for there is no Liberal party in Germany. The party that bears that name is liberal neither in economic nor in political policy.

Germany is the realm of the drill sergeant. Efficiency is branded on every brow. Everybody obeys orders. And yet one-half of this order-loving people are Social Democrats whose fiery orators talk openly of the day when the God-ordained crown shall yield before man-ordained majorities. The drill sergeant represents the monarchy, the Social Democrat represents democracy. Both you find in their highest development in this land of perfect national routine and perfect municipal housekeeping.

Nowhere else has monarchy survived feudalism with such self-conscious splendor and with such a feudalistic sense of duty. The Kaiser earnestly attempts to be the German all-father. He is overlord and patriarch. The Hohenzollern theory is that the Hohenzollern heart is ample to embrace all subjects, even Socialists, and to provide for them all. The Iron Chancellor soon after the fusion of the new empire promulgated his industrial insurance laws in this spirit. The sick, the aged, the injured are all cared for, and the unemployed are bridged over their time of distress. One million marks a day is the cost of this paternalism. There are very few members of this paragon of organized efficiency who are not the recipient of some public moneys. Working-men, State officials of all grades, private employees (*privat angestellten*), almost every one except professional men and employers, are embraced in the ever-widening schedules of State beneficence.

Germany became the pensioner's Paradise because Bismark thought that his State insurance would insure the fealty of the subject. His great bribe failed dismally. Because the day of the subject has gone by forever; it has yielded to the day of the citizen.

Bismark unquestionably was stimulated in his vast scheme for improving the material conditions of the working-men by Ferdinand Lassalle, the most brilliant Socialist of Europe. But Lassalle's motives and Bismark's were at antipodes. Lassalle would clothe and feed the humble worker that he might become a better fighter for his "rights"; Bismark would "give him something in his mouth," as he called it, to quiet his adjectives; Lassalle would feed the working-man to rouse him to battle, Bismark would feed him to soothe him into quiescence.

Lassalle's idea has won. What would the great Chancellor say if he were a witness of recent events in his Empire? The Social Democrats, whom he hunted like wild animals, chasing them from town to town, forbidding their literature, stopping their meetings, disbanding their labor unions, imprisoning their leaders, ostracizing their writers, and attempting every gag rule known to shrewd parliamentarians to stop their mouthings in the Reichstag, these despised underlings have grown into the predominating political power in the Empire of the Hohenzollerns. To-day 110 Social Democrats sit in the Reichstag, the largest group in that body. And Herr Bebel, the wood-turner, who has crossed swords with every Chancellor and who is unquestionably one of the ablest men in European politics, came within a few votes of being chosen president of the national assembly, where Bismark tried in vain to deny him the right of free speech only thirty-five years ago.

Why? Because the Kaiser and his "*Regierung*" have blindly and bitterly fought the advance of democratic ideals. They crushed every middle-class effort toward true representative government. The legerdemain of Bismark, when he manipulated the great Liberal party of Prussia in the sixties and transformed it into a conservative stronghold, remains one of the greatest achievements of political necromancy in all history. But the reactionary statesmen of Germany failed to transform the Social Democrats, they failed to frighten them, and they failed to crush them. Middle-class democracy proved timid and worship-willing: the working-man's democracy remains bold and belligerent.

The election laws of the German states indicate the *bourgeois* attitude toward democracy. Universal manhood suffrage is almost unknown in the German states. In Saxony a new election law was passed only a few years ago. It

divides the voters into four classes, according to income, and the members of each class have one, two, three, and four votes, according to their well-being. But the income, which is the basis of this stratification, must come from property or professional service. It cannot come from the handicrafts or daily labor. The result is obvious. The laboring-man gets one vote. He is in the majority in Dresden, Chemnitz, and Leipsic, thriving cities of Saxony. But this device keeps him in a perpetual political minority.

In Prussia the three-class system prevails. The taxes paid in the election precincts are divided into three classes: upper, lower, and middle. Those who pay the upper one-third are the first class, those who pay the middle third are the second class, and those who pay the lower one-third are the third class. Each of these classes chooses one-third of the electors, who, in turn, appoint the representatives to the Prussian diet. It often happens that one or two men pay one-third of the taxes of a precinct and one or two pay the middle third. The result is that the few in class one and two outvote the many in class three. So disastrous is this selective system to the Social Democrats that in a House of 422 members they have only seven seats, while they cast 23.9 per cent. of all the votes.

The ancient free cities—Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck—cling to electoral systems as ancient and gray as their charters. And so one might go through the entire roll of states.

There is no democratic basis to the German state. The members of the Reichstag are elected by universal suffrage. Bismark had to make this concession to the smaller states. But the Reichstag is only a debating society. The Chancellor is imposed upon it by the Kaiser. It holds the purse-strings, but the Kaiser holds the purse.

The spirit of the Government is dogmatic, unyielding. *Lèse majesté* still prevents free speech. Strictly speaking, there is no political liberty in Germany. Men are imprisoned for expressing certain political opinions. And men are punished for belonging to the Social Democratic party. No Social Democrat is appointed to office. He cannot even be the official valet to a Prussian lieutenant. When a high official in the civil service was asked if the public servants were free from political interference he said: "Absolutely so; we can do and think as we please, only we must have nothing to do with the Social Democrats. That means dismissal."

The Government's excuse is: The Social Democrats are enemies of monarchy. On the other hand, the Social Democrats are no less arbitrary and dogmatic than the Conservatives. They hold themselves proudly aloof from all court functions. The members of the Reichstag never attend the receptions given by the high functionaries. In Saxony the democratic members of the legislature never grace the King's receptions with their picturesque presence. This phariseism on both sides is very amusing. Last autumn when Berlin dedicated a new city hall the Social Democratic city officials refused to attend, because the programme provided that three cheers be given for the Kaiser. They never participate in any expression of good-will or confidence toward a Government that eyes them with suspicion and closes the doors of political opportunity in their face. The South Germans are more congenial in temper, and the King of Bavaria is not afraid to shake hands with von Vollmar, the able and patriotic leader of the Liberal wing of the Social Democracy.

This condition of affairs cannot last much longer. Democracy is bound to win in Germany. The last election, with its 4,250,000 Social Democratic votes, to say nothing of the hundreds of thousands of Radicals, cannot pass unheeded. There are two reasons why this self-imposed bureaucracy must yield. First the political reason: such a preponderating mass of voters will bend the back of even a Hohenzollern; and second, the economic reason. The German Empire has built up German greatness by artificial stimuli. State aid has bolstered up everything. This has checked that private initiative and personal ambition which is the engineery of success in a country where *laissez faire* prevails. Sooner or later this will prove fatal. Private enterprise must have an outlet. If the State chokes the economic outlet, it must provide another. Democracy offers an open door of political opportunity; and personal initiative in politics may be a corollary to State paternalism in industry. The first achievement of German democracy will be the amending of the federal consitution, making the Chancellor and his ministry responsible to the Reichstag. Without parliamentary responsibility representative government is a farce. Bismark knew this. He laughed up his sleeve when he threw the sop of universal suffrage to the little states and preserved the Kaiser a sovereign, with the sole power of naming the cabinet.

For some years past the democrats in the Reichstag have brought in resolutions looking forward to this change. Now that they can summon a majority they may effect this great and popular change within a few years. Then will follow liberal suffrage laws. Alsace-Lorraine was given a new constitution last summer, with a provision for universal manhood suffrage. Bebel was jubilant over this democratic victory, and it was the first time in his long parliamentary career that he had voted with the Government on a constitutional question. This is the entering wedge. Even reactionary Prussia is now considering the widening of her electorate.

There is a good deal of misapprehension abroad about the German Social Democracy. It is democratic rather than Socialistic. Of Socialism pure and simple—if there is such a thing—you hear nothing. The party has receded step by step from its former silly isolation and has learned in the school of experience that theories will not win fights. The Government made Socialists through the medium of the police and the censor. When persecution ceases, Socialism will have become so identified with democracy that an observer will be baffled to tell the difference. As it is, the Marxian dogmas are almost forgotten lore. Social Democracy in Germany is Jeffersonian rather than Marxian. It is political, not economic. It seeks control of the Government, not of property. It pushes its “ultimate goal” farther and farther into the dim mirage of the unknown future.

Meantime a genuine middle-class liberalism will arise. Maybe the *Hansa Bund*, now well organized and active, will prove the nucleus of a party which will lure the middle-class liberal, who is still afraid of the red boggy of Social Democracy.

The ferment of a new political zeal has converted the phlegmatic, practical, stolid kingdom of the Briton into an Isle of Unrest. Burke, Bright, and Gladstone, the great Commoners, would be astounded at the changes that are being wrought in the democracy of the English.

Let us take two well-known examples: one economic, one political; one resulting from the other, and both the outgrowth of the radical enthusiasm of the people.

The first is the budget of Lloyd George, the daring Chancellor of the Exchequer. Two-thirds of the land of the

kingdom is owned by about 12,000 persons. The ancient theory that land-owning confers social and political distinction is not extinct. The landed gentry have for centuries controlled the machinery of government, and therefore the devices of taxation. In consequence land values have been allowed to stand on an antiquated valuation made over 240 years ago, before there was a Liverpool, a Manchester, or a Leeds, and when the suburbs of London scarcely touched the precincts of Westminster. The Industrial Revolution completely shifted values. The new manufacturing centers created new and fabulous fortunes for the fortunate owners of the land; the barons, dukes, and lords, through no effort or virtue on their part, became the owners of cities, the landlords of teeming populations. A handful of men own the ground over which the sprawling municipal giant London is stretched. Ground rents and ninety-nine-year leases are the corner-stones of many English fortunes. All these years the lessors were taxed on modern values, the land-owners on ancient values, of their respective properties.

Lloyd George is an advocate of vast schemes of social reform. These cost money. And he conceived the revolutionary idea of raising the money from the land-owners—the “land monopoly,” he calls it. He determined to have a new land valuation and to tax the unearned increment. His famous land budget was received by the populace with enthusiasm and passed the House of Commons by a very large majority. But the House of Lords balked. This was natural. They were nearly all landed proprietors, many of them hereditary owners of vast acreages that would be heavily burdened by the new tax. The radical tide that swept the neo-Liberals into power dashed itself into fury on the conservative obduracy of the Lords, who considered themselves beyond the reach of the democratic tempest. They vetoed the budget.

Not since the days of Queen Anne had the Lords dared to break the precedent of centuries that accords to the House of Commons the sole privilege of controlling financial legislation. The resentment of the Commons was instant. They at once asked the King to prorogue Parliament and appealed to the people to decide on the budget. After a spirited campaign in which war songs were blended with vehement oratory the budget won by a substantial majority. A popu-

lar chorus, sung everywhere to our tune of "Marching through Georgia," reveals the spirit of the contest:

"The land, the land, God gave us all the land.
The land, the land, the ground on which we stand.
Why should we be beggars with the ballot in our hand?
God gave the land to the people."

The Lords, submitting to the decree of the electors, consented to the budget, and the most revolutionary piece of economic legislation since John Bright's Repeal Act was spread upon the royal parchments.

Democracy had wrested a democratic budget from aristocracy, but it was not content. The last vestige of legislative power was now taken from the reluctant peers. Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, brought in his famous Parliament Bill. It deprived the House of Lords of the power of altering a "money bill" and gave the House of Commons the power of passing any other bill over the Lords' veto. In short, the House of Lords was deprived of legislative authority and converted into a clumsy and top-heavy advisory council.

Naturally the peers did not wish to officiate at their own funeral. The bill that had received 120 majority in the representative chamber met a stubborn majority of 500 against it in the hereditary chamber. Then the Prime Minister quietly announced that "on the advice of His Majesty's ministers" the King had consented to create enough new peers to insure the passage of the Act. Four hundred new peers, and all at once! The social value of a coronet reduced by fifty per cent. in the stock exchange of snobdom! This had an instantaneous effect. Enough peers refrained from voting and enough bishops were thrust into the Liberal lobby to insure a majority for the bill. Thus the last vestige of hereditary privilege in legislation was wiped out of the British constitution.

The result was received by the people with less emotion than the returns of a famous cricket-match or a Henley regatta.

To an eye-witness during the debate in the Commons and again during the passage of the bill through the House of Lords two things stood forth markedly. First, the almost entire absence of constitutional or legal arguments presented in either House, by either side, for or against the bill. Some of the members in private said they had read *The Federalist* to fortify themselves on the comparative

virtues of a bi-cameral or a uno-cameral system. But such researches never cropped out in the debate. The discussion was political; the participants contented themselves with throwing partisan spit-balls at one another.

The second thing noticeable was the lack of popular interest in the "revolution." One day there were not twenty members on the benches during the debate on the second reading in the House of Commons, and a Labor member admonished the speaker that "during this hour of a grave constitutional crisis only twenty men are found brave enough to face the country's danger!" Even the indolent crowds around Westminster that can be collected at a minute's notice were indifferent to the proceedings. In Gladstone's day, when Home Rule was in the caldron, throngs used to gather daily to see the great Commoner alight from his carriage. Even this idolatry of the masses was lacking.

These instances indicate the advancement of the spirit of democracy. Democracy is now so commonplace in England, the populace is so self-assured of its premiership, that it can forget the critical periods of legislation, can content itself with the routine of its daily toil and ignore the routine of its politicians. In a democracy the people are aroused only when they sense danger.

Following up its new Radicalism, England now proposes to abolish all property qualifications for voting. The "latch-key" franchise is to give way to universal manhood suffrage and probably a limited female suffrage. The last session of the House of Commons voted its members a salary of \$2,000 a year. Hitherto they had been unpaid. Under proposed legislation the state is to assume all necessary election expenses. These costs, including printing of ballots, payment of election judges, etc., are now borne by the candidates, and, as they often run over \$3,000, the poor man is shut out. The Labor members have their expenses paid by the unions.

So the bars of political privilege are all being taken down, and a new herd of office-seekers are swarming into the public pastures. The new element is introducing a new species of legislation. It is social legislation. Grave ministers of state make long speeches on the death-rate of babies in cities; on the cost of living; on that most heart-breaking of modern woes, non-employment. Even Gladstone foresaw the day when the social questions would absorb politics.

But Gladstone could not foresee that an extreme Socialist like Keir Hardie would be faithfully reported in the *Times*, or that the Celtic fervor of a Lloyd George would bring about Wesleyan changes in the Whig party, or that a Balfour would spend his declining days in proving that Conservatism will not allow Liberalism to monopolize "the people's cause," or that the brilliant, word-loving Lord Rosebery, the national orator, would repeat for the hundredth time, "We are all Socialists now."

This neo-democratic movement in all of these countries has one common characteristic—it arises from one common source. The laboring-men are "finding themselves," as the German idiom forcefully puts it. It would be more accurate to say that they have found themselves. They are pressing their social and economic demands through the avenues of politics, and democracy is the form of government which yields most readily to their demands. The laboring-men and their sympathizers are, therefore, forcing democracy upon kingdoms and principalities. This is a new force in political life, a potency De Tocqueville could not foresee.

This new democracy is Social Democracy. It has for its prompter no elaborate political philosophy, such as Rousseau and Godwin formulated over a century and a half ago for the "brotherhood" or political-equality democracy, of which our Declaration of Independence is an outgrowth. There are no scintillating epigrams or "axioms" to arouse the enthusiasm of the logician and the super-refined discriminations of the pedant. To-day this democracy of the blouse is prompted by hard facts and the urgent necessities of the moment.

European democracy is Social Democracy because the social question is dominant, and the social question is dominant because labor has entered politics. In every European country a Labor party is organized. It is usually more or less "Socialistic." But it does not disdain practical politics. It can forget the vagaries of Utopian economics in the ardor of the hour. These organized workmen have a most effective way of making themselves understood and feared. In France they have 120 members in the Chamber of Deputies. Their enthusiasm varies from the quixotic violence of the anarchistic Syndicalist to the cautious intellectualism of Millerand and Briand. In Belgium the Labor party domi-

nates the Liberal element; and it does not hesitate to resort to the powder and curbstone argument to compel the old order to make way for the new. In Germany the laboring-man has permeated the army with a new internationalism, has brought about profound changes in municipal and national lawmaking, and has brought the Empire to the verge of parliamentary democracy. And in England the Labor party, with its forty members in Parliament and its million voters, has compelled a coalition with the Liberal party that virtually places at the disposal of labor all the prerogatives of Empire.

Democracy in Europe has attained a new impetus through the political organization of labor and has achieved power through forcing a coalition of Socialists, Radicals, and Liberals: a coalition which foreshadows greater changes in the international policies of Europe and the internal polity of its empires than did the conquests of Charlemagne, the triumphs of Cromwell, the genius of Frederick the Great, the ambitions of the Bourbons, and the havoc of the military minotaur, Napoleon Bonaparte. Because it is shifting government from a property to a personal basis. It is creating a new political paternalism and is threatening that individualism which Americans have been taught to revere as the mother of progress.

In the light of recent movements in Europe our democracy remains the most conservative democracy in the world. Can you imagine a transformation in the Federal Senate such as the English democrats affected in their House of Lords? Or the kaleidoscopic changes of Paris taking place at Washington? Or the Erfurt Programme of Herr Bebel's party adopted as the platform of either of our great parties?

It is true we have no burdensome militarism, no hereditary tinsel, and have achieved universal manhood suffrage. In spite of all this, democracy in Europe is more radical in theory and in practice than democracy in America. This will remain true just as long as the laboring-men continue to trust the promises of the old parties. When their suspicions and their prejudices impel them to organize a genuine political Labor party of their own, European Social Democracy will invade our Capitol.

Maybe that day is not far distant.

SAMUEL P. ORTH.